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Coleridge, Samuel Taylor, 1772-1834

"Coleridge's Literary Remains, Volume 4."


'Which'! The 'man' is self-conscious alike when he remembers, wills, and
understands; but in what sense is the generic term "memory" conscious to
the generic word "will?" This is mere nonsense. Are memory,
understanding, and volition persons,--self-subsistents? If not, what are
they to the purpose? Who doubts that Jehovah is consciously powerful,
consciously wise, consciously good; and that it is the same Jehovah, who
in being omnipotent, is good and wise; in being wise, omnipotent and
good; in being good, is wise and omnipotent? But what has all this to do
with a distinction of Persons? Instead of one Tri-unity we might have a
mille-unity. The fact is, that Sherlock, and (for aught I know) Gregory
Nyssen, had not the clear idea of the Trinity, positively; but only a
negative Arianism.

Ib. p. 127.
He proceeds to shew that this unity is without all manner of confusion
and mixture, * * for the mind that loves, is in the love. * * * And
the knowledge of the mind which knows and loves itself, is in the
mind, and in its love, because it loves itself, knowing, and knows
itself loving: and thus also two are in each, for the mind which knows
and loves itself, with its knowledge is in love, and with its love is
in knowledge.
Then why do we make tri-personality in unity peculiar to God?
The doctrine of the Trinity (the foundation of all rational theology, no
less than the precondition and ground of the rational possibility of the
Christian Faith, that is, the Incarnation and Redemption), rests
securely on the position,--that in man 'omni actioni praeit sua propria
passio; Deus autem est actus purissimus sine ulla potentialitate'.


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