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Coleridge, Samuel Taylor, 1772-1834

"Coleridge's Literary Remains, Volume 4."


--"That is,--if the three Persons are not three;"--so might the Arian
answer, unless Sherlock had shown the difference of separate and
distinct relatively to mind. "For what other separation can be conceived
in mind but distinction? Distinction may be joined with imperfection, as
ignorance, or forgetfulness; and so it is in men:--and if this be called
separation by a metaphor from bodies, then the conclusion would be that
in the Supreme Mind there is distinction without imperfection; and then
the question is, whence comes plurality of Persons? Can it be conceived
other than as the result of imperfection, that is, finiteness?

Ib. p. 98.
Thus each Divine Person is God, and all of them but the same one God;
as I explained it before.
O no! asserted it.

Ib. p. 98-9.
This one supreme God is Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, a Trinity in
Unity, three Persons and one God. Now Father, Son, and Holy Ghost,
with all their divine attributes and perfections (excepting their
personal properties, which the Schools call the 'modi subsistendi',
that one is the Father, the other the Son, and the other the Holy
Ghost, which cannot be communicated to each other) are whole and
entire in each Person by a mutual consciousness; each feels the other
Persons in himself, all their essential wisdom, power, goodness,
justice, as he feels himself, and this makes them essentially one, as
I have proved at large.

Will not the Arian object, "You admit the 'modus subsistendi' to be a
divine perfection, and you affirm that it is incommunicable.


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