Neither was Russian mobilization in four military districts
on July 29 a cause of the war; for that was only an external
manifestation of the Russian state of mind toward the Balkan peoples, a
state of mind well known to all publicists ever since the Treaty of
Berlin in 1878. No more was the invasion of Belgium by the German Army
on Aug. 4 a true cause of the war, or even the cause, as distinguished
from the occasion, of Great Britain's becoming involved in it. By that
action Germany was only taking the first step in carrying out a
long-cherished purpose and in executing a judicious plan of campaign
prepared for many years in advance. The artificial panic in Germany
about its exposed position between two powerful enemies, France and
Russia, was not a genuine cause of the war; for the General Staff knew
they had crushed France once, and were confident they could do it again
in a month. As to Russia, it was, in their view, a huge nation, but
very clumsy and dull in war.
The real causes of the war are all of many years' standing; and all the
nations now involved in the fearful catastrophe have contributed to the
development of one or more of these effective causes.
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