If it did, it was guilty of duplicity, for the German Ambassador at St.
Petersburg gave to the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs an express
assurance that
"the German Government _had no knowledge of the text of the
Austrian note before it was handed in and has not exercised
any influence on its contents. It is a mistake to attribute to
Germany a threatening attitude_."
[Russian "Orange Paper," No. 18.]
This statement is inherently improbable. Austria was the weaker of the
two allies and it was Germany's sabre that it was rattling in the face
of Europe. Obviously Austria could not have proceeded to extreme
measures, which it was recognized from the first would antagonize
Russia, unless it had the support of Germany, and there is a
probability, amounting to a moral certainty, that it would not have
committed itself and Germany to the possibility of a European war
without first consulting Germany.
Moreover, we have the testimony of Sir M. de Bunsen, the English
Ambassador in Vienna, who advised Sir Edward Grey that he had "private
information that the German Ambassador (at Vienna) knew the text of the
Austrian ultimatum to Servia before it was dispatched and telegraphed it
to the German Emperor," and that the German Ambassador himself "indorses
every line of it.
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